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Abstract
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) use the Internet or
other data network service as a backbone to provide a se-
cure connection across a potentially hostile WAN. Such se-
curity guarantees provide the motivation for VPN deploy-
ment. This security does, however, come at a performance
cost brought about by the increased processing overhead.
This paper presents an investigation into these overheads.
In particular, this investigation will consider different user
resource availability in addition to router type and encryp-
tion algorithms.
1. Introduction
This work comes from the simulation of several broad
categories of users. Researchers with high speed net-
working capabilities (GEANT) and SMEs, with more con-
strained bandwidth links have very different resource avail-
ability and as such suffer from different consequences of
IPsec performance overhead. The results will indicate the
realistic performance of IPsec under a range of conditions.
These conditions will be representative of various software
and hardware platforms commonly available, correspond-
ing to different user categories.
In total, five user categories are represented in terms of
bandwidth; specifically 100Mbps, 34Mbps, 4Mbps, 2Mbps
and 1Mbps links. These were tested using three different
routers (AMD Opteron, Compaq DL380 G2 and Pentium
III 550 10/100 ports). Two algorithms are being used (AES
for encryption and MD5 for authentication) and tests are
being done for both TCP and UDP transport protocols.
This work has evolved from an investigation within the
TORRENT IST project where there is a requirement to en-
cipher a communications link between one server (LAP)
and many clients. In time, this has led to an evaluation of
the performance implications of using IPsec to achieve this
goal. This, in turn, has brought about a more detailed in-
vestigation as it became apparent that there were scalability
issues involved.
This work is partly funded by TORRENT1, an IST FP5
project and by SEINIT2 an IST FP6 Integrated Project.
The results of this work will feed into WP4 of the SEINIT
project.
2 IPsec Protocol Suite
IPsec is the security architecture for the Internet Proto-
col (IP). This protocol is applicable to both IPv4 and IPv6.
The architecture is defined in [1] and addresses the follow-
ing 4 elements:
• Security Protocols: Authentication Header (AH) [2]
and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)[3].
• Security Associations: Definition, management and
processing.[6]
• Key Management: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
[6],[7],[8],[9].
• Algorithms: Requirements of the authentication and
encryption algorithms.
2.1 Security Protocols
Traffic Security is provided by two security protocols:
• The Authentication Header protocol [2] provides con-
nectionless integrity and data origin authentication.
There is also an optional anti-replay service available.
• The Encapsulating Security Payload protocol [3] [4]
[5] potentially provides two types of security service.
The first is confidentiality via encryption and limited
traffic flow confidentiality. The second type is con-
nectionless integrity, data origin authentication and an
anti-replay service.
Either of these protocols can be applied alone or in com-
bination, thus providing the desired level of security. The
IPsec security protocols are represented by headers that ap-





The security protocol headers do not contain informa-
tion pertaining to the cryptographic algorithms and the as-
sociated parameters. These representations are achieved
through the transmission of aSecurity Parameter Index
(SPI). This index combined with the destination IP ad-
dresses and the type of protocol header (AH or ESP) de-
termines the parameters of the IPsec processing.
These parameters of a unidirectional security service are
represented by a Security Association (SA). There are two
types of SAs:
• Transport Mode SA: This is a security association be-
tween two hosts, generally used to secure the traffic of
the upper layer protocols.
• Tunnel Mode SA: This is a security association in an
IP-in-IP tunnel, generally used in connecting to secu-
rity gateways.
2.3 Key Management
IPsec mandates support for two separate methods of
cryptographic key and SA management: manual and au-
tomatic.
• Manual Key Management: This is the simplest form
of key management and involves each IPsec connec-
tion to be configured manually on both hosts. While
this is suitable in small static situations, it is unsuit-
able in larger deployment scenarios due to scalability
problems.
• Automatic Key and SA Management: Larger deploy-
ment scenarios call for an Internet-standard, scalable
and automated SA and key management protocol.
This is provided byInternet Key Exchange (IKE). IKE
is required to allow for use of anti-replay features of
AH and ESP and to facilitate on-demand creation of
SAs.
2.4 Algorithms
The IPsec protocol suite does not define the authenti-
cation and encryption algorithms used in implementations.
These are defined in individual RFCs per algorithm. Algo-
rithms used in these tests were:
• AES [10]
• HMAC-MD5 [11] [12]
Our reasons for choosing these algorithms are higher
performance and are detailed in [?].
3 Scenarios
The version of IPsec used for this paper is built into the
2.6+ linux [14] kernels, for this paper the 2.6.1 kernel was
used. There are a number of tools [15] that come with the
kernel to aid in setting up the security associations needed
for two hosts to speak IPsec, setkey command is used here.
setkey can setup either tunnel or transport mode security
connection.
The scenario is as follows: a set of routers will route
secure traffic between two seperate networks, where the
third network is assumed untrusted and simulates the In-
ternet. After this scenario is set up, the bandwidth on the
links is shaped to replicate common configurations in real
world sceanrios. The configurations that are replicated rep-
resent researchers with the high speed network capabilities
(GEANT) and SME’s with more constrained bandwidth
links. This translates into running the experiments over









Figure 1. Illustration of Network Scenario
4 Testbed Configuration
There are three networks in this experiment,
192.168.10.0 is the Server network, 10.37.100.0 is
the Client network and 159.10.10.0 is the assumed un-
trusted network. The Server is located at 192.168.10.100,
and the Client is located at 10.37.100.40. The routers
will be set up to route traffic from Server to Client and
the return path. Note though that IP forwarding must first
be enabled with the following command on both routers
before traffic can be routed. After this is set up, any packet
recieved by the router, that is not destined for one of
its interface addresses, is routed through the appropriate
interface. This interface is determined from the routes set
up on the router.
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forwarding
IPS 2004 Budapest, Hungary
171
4.1 Equipment used
All of the machines involved were using Linux Kernel
version 2.6.1
• SERVER = Dual PIII 850 blade server running
100Mbps
• CLIENT = Dual PIII 850 blade client running
100Mbps
• ROUTER1 = Dual Xeon 2.4Ghz Compaq DL380-G3
• ROUTER2 = Dual PIII 850
• ROUTER3 = Dual AMD Opteron 2400
4.2 Setting up the routes
The Server machine needs to know how to route traffic
to the Client network, located in the 10.37.100.0 network.
This traffic is routed to the Server Router.
route add -net 10.37.100.0 \
netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 192.168.10.2
The Client machine needs to know how to route traffic
to the Server network, located in the 192.168.10.0 network.
This traffic is routed to the Client Router.
route add -net 192.168.10.0 \
netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 10.37.100.50
The Server router can route traffic directly to the Client
router, so any traffic this router recieves destined for the
Client network is sent to the Client router
route add -net 10.37.100.0 \
netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 159.10.10.2
The Client router can route traffic directly to the Server
router, so any traffic this router recieves destined for the
Server network is sent to the Server router.
route add -net 192.168.10.0 \
netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 159.10.10.1
4.3 Setting up IPsec Tunnel mode
We used manual keying for both authentication and en-
cryption. As we wished to measure the performance of
the routers. Tunnel Mode was employed. The security
association provides confidentiality, data origin authentica-
tion, and connectionless integrity through the use of ESP.
The crytographic algorithm used for ESP confidentiality is
AES, and for ESP authentication is MD5. The following is
applied to the setkey command (through the -f option) on
the Router on the Client Side.
spdflush;
flush;
add 159.10.10.2 159.10.10.1 \




add 159.10.10.1 159.10.10.2 \




spdadd 192.168.10.100/32 10.37.100.40/32 \
any -P out IPsec \
esp/tunnel/159.10.10.2-159.10.10.1/require;
spdadd 10.37.100.40/32 192.168.10.100/32 \
any -P in IPsec \
esp/tunnel/159.10.10.1-159.10.10.2/require;
And the router on the Server side
spdflush;
flush;
add 159.10.10.2 159.10.10.1 \




add 159.10.10.1 159.10.10.2 \




spdadd 192.168.10.100/32 10.37.100.40/32 \
any -P in IPsec \
esp/tunnel/159.10.10.2-159.10.10.1/require;
spdadd 10.37.100.40/32 192.168.10.100/32 \
any -P out IPsec \
esp/tunnel/159.10.10.1-159.10.10.2/require;
Spdflush and flush erase all IPsec associations in the
kernel then, the one that are used for the experiments are
added. An association is set up on theclient router to the
server router and vice-versa In summary, the above com-
mands tell the kernel to apply ESP tunnel mode IPsec to
packets originating from address 192.168.10.100 (Server)
and with destination address 10.37.100.40 (Client). An as-
sociation in the kernel is created for the opposite direction
also.
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4.4 Performance Measuring Setup
The main performance measure this paper is focused on
is the throughput, and processor overhead associated with
IPsec. The throughput was measured with Iperf. Iperf
[16] is a freely available, multi-platform bandwidth mea-
surement tool. Iperf can measure many network related
parameters, in this case we were really only interested in
bandwidth, the processor overhead generated on the router
and the relationship between them. As we wished to mea-
sure lower bandwidths than 100Mbps, the linux traffic con-
troller tc was used to achieve lower throughputs.
4.4.1 Setting up tc
tc is a linux program used to control and shape traffic on an
interface, although this program has quite a complex set of
options, only one was used for our purposes.
tc qdisc add dev eth0 root tbf rate 34mbit \
burst 10kb latency 70ms
The above command will constrain the related network
interface to a throughput of 34 Mbps. A command similiar
to this was issued on both routers before Iperf was started.
4.4.2 Setting up cyclesoak
Cyclesoak [17] is a tool for accurately measuring system
load andused to measure CPU utilization, by soaking up all
idle cycles and calculating the load on the CPU. This tool
is run on both routers, as it was here that we were interested
in the processor overhead.
4.5 Performance Tests
There were three routers in all, each with dual process-
ing cababilites. Tests were performed on the routers in
single processor mode and dual processor mode, to give
a richer set of results.
5. Results
If we first examine Figure 3, we can see that all the
routers are capable of routing 34Mbps of IPsec encrypted
traffic with varying loads on the processors (Figure 5,
colums labeled 34, 4, 2, 1). This is also reflected in Ta-
bles 1, 2 and 3.
Interestingly, as can be seen from Figure 5, one could
deploy a Single Processor Pentium III machine to act as a
VPN gateway if the bandwidth requirements were 34Mbps
(Figure 5) or less, with some headroom. Whats is also in-
teresting is the comparison of the Xeon versus the Opteron













































Figure 3. Throughput Analysis
Table 1. Flextel Blade Dual PIII 850 Mhz
Link Speed Router Single Router Dual
Throughput Overhead Throughput Overhead
100 61.1 100% 70 70.9%
34 32.5 50.6% 31.8 32.5%
4 3.8 8.6% 3.8 4.1%
2 1.92 4.8% 1.92 2.3%
1 960 2.8% 960 1.5%
Table 2. Dual Xeon 2.4Ghz
Link Speed Router Single Router Dual
Throughput Overhead Throughput Overhead
100 93.8 73.98% 93.8 23.21%
34 32.5 32.9% 32.5 9.28%
4 3.8 9.56% 3.8 3.12%
2 1.92 6.01% 1.92 2.01%
1 960 4.23% 960 .71%
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Table 3. AMD Dual Opteron 2400
Bandwidth Router Single Router Dual
Throughput Overhead Throughput Overhead
100 93.8 52.03% 93.8 30.13%
34 32.7 17.96% 32.7 10.38%
4 3.8 2.4% 3.8 1.38%
2 1.92 1.25% 1.92 .66%
1 .96 .6% .96 .31%
greater effect than one would expect with the addition of
a single processor. It manifests itself as the single proces-
sor Opteron showing less overhead than the Single proces-
sor Xeon, and the Dual Opteron showing more overhead
than the Dual Xeon. This appears to be the effect the Xeon
Hyper-Threading Technology has; we need to investigate
this further.
6. Conclusion & Further Work
We need to return to the issue of the Xeon’s Hyper-
Threading technology. Also we would like to compare
these results against a commercial offering. Also we would
like to investigate how the addition of Hardware Acceler-
ators would aid asoftware router to compete against the
commercial offering.
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